A representative human upper respiratory tract model consisting of oropharyngeal and asymmetric tracheobronchial(TB) airways from the trachea(G0) to the main lobar bronchi(G2) was constructed. Laminar-to-turbulent airflow for typical inhalation modes as well as micro-particle transportation,wall deposition and mass flow to lobes was simulated using the CFX10.0 software from Ansys Inc. The numerical particle deposition efficiency of the oropharynx region and two generations(G1 and G2) of TB airways shows great agreement with the experimental data obtained from realistic casts. The particle deposition pattern indicates that inertial impaction is the primary mechanism in the human upper airway,and turbulence dispersion performs crescent influence especially for small particles. The initial positions of particles with different fates are confined to specifically concentrated zones. The particle mass distributions of five lobes are close to airflow distributions. The upper lobes receive fewer particles than lower lobes and the right middle lobe receives the least.
In this paper, we study the public goods games with punishment by adopting the well-known approximate best response dynamics. It shows that the evolution of cooperation is affected by two aspects when other parameters are fixed. One is the punishment mechanism which can avoid the dilemma of lacking investment, and the other is the degree of rationality. Theoretical analysis and numerical results indicate that the existence of punishment mechanism and distribution of rationality are the keys to the enhancement of cooperation level. We also testify that they can heavily influence the payoffs of system as well. The findings in this paper may provide a deeper understanding of some social dilemmas.
Wang ZhenXu Zhao-JinHuang Jian-HuaZhang Lian-Zhong
In this work, the optional public goods games with punishment are studied. By adopting the approximate best response dynamics, a micro model is given to explain the evolutionary process. Simultaneously, the magnitude of rationality is also considered. Under the condition of bounded rationality which provides a light to interpret phenomena in human society, the model leads to two types of equilibriums. One is the equilibrium without punishers and the other is the equilibrium including only punishers and cooperators. In addition, the effects of rationality on equilibriums are briefly investigated.
