Effects of information asymmetry on cooperation in the prisoners' dilemma game are investigated. The amplitude A is introduced to describe the degree of information asymmetry. It is found that there exists an optimal value of amplitude Aopt at which the fraction of cooperation reaches its maximal value. The reason lies in that cooperators on the two-dimensional grid form large clusters at Aopt . In addition, the theoretical analysis in terms of the meanfield theory is used to understand this kind of phenomenon. It is confirmed that the information asymmetry plays an important role in the dynamics of the dilemma games of spatial prisoners.
We study the role of unbiased migration in cooperation in the framework of the spatial evolutionary game on a variety of spatial structures, namely a regular lattice, continuous plane and complex networks. A striking finding is that migration plays a universal role in cooperation, regardless of the spatial structure. For a high degree of migration, cooperators cannot survive owing to their failure to form cooperator clusters that resist attacks by defectors. Meanwhile, for a low degree of migration, cooperation is considerably enhanced relative to that in the static spatial game, which is due to the strengthening of the boundaries of cooperator clusters by the occasional accumulation of cooperators along the boundaries. The cooperator cluster thus becomes more robust than that in the static game and defectors near the boundary can be assimilated by cooperators. The cooperator cluster thus expands, which facilitates cooperation. The general role of migration will be substantiated by sufficient simulations relating to heuristic explanations.
This paper focuses on the application of Exp-function method to obtain generalized solutions of the KdV-Burgers-Kuramoto equation and the Kuramoto-Sivashinsky equation.It is demonstrated that the Exp-function method provides a mathematical tool for solving the nonlinear evolution equation in mathematical physics.
